Initial Review of the Environmental Impacts of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

for PRESS and UEP

by Lynn dela Merced
Radioactive Waste Management Associates

October 2000

One of the nation’s three uranium-enrichment facilities, the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (or PORTS) sits on 3,708 acres of land near the Village of Piketon, 20 mi north of Portsmouth, and about 1 mi east of the Scioto River in Pike County¹.

Owned by DOE-until 1993, PORTS was first operated under contract by Goodyear Atomic from 1956 to 1986, followed by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems (formerly, Martin Marietta Energy Systems) from 1986 to 1998. On July 1, 1993, control of Portsmouth passed from the DOE to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), a wholly owned government corporation created by Congress in an attempt to transform the DOE’s uranium enrichment enterprise into a profitable business. The USEC, which also operates another former DOE enrichment facility in Paducah, KY, was privatized on July 28, 1998². The current contractor is Bechtel Jacobs.

When it began operations in 1954, the Portsmouth Plant’s mission has been to enrich uranium (that is, increase the concentration of U-235) for government and commercial purposes. Only 0.711% U-235 is found naturally in uranium. Through a process known as gaseous diffusion, uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) is passed through a series of converters and compressors to yield a product enriched to 97% U-235 for the nuclear weapons and naval nuclear propulsion programs. Uranium at 2 to 7% enrichment is removed as a side product for use in light-water reactors^3,4. At present, Portsmouth works in tandem with Paducah to produce only low-grade, commercial uranium for use by civilian power and naval reactors⁵. Paducah performs the initial phase of separating uranium for reactor fuel and then ships its product to Portsmouth for a second stage to further raise the concentration of fissile uranium to 3 to 5%^6,7.

DOE, who retains responsibility for environmental restoration and waste management activities at the site, and USEC have both acknowledged pollution problems⁸ but have consistently downplayed the gravity of the problem.

Plant processes, especially the cleaning and changeout of process equipment, generated spent solvents and other chemical and radioactive contaminants that were disposed of in onsite landfills and surface impoundments. The chemical contaminants include chlorinated solvents (such as tricholoroethylene or TCE), chlorinated solvents mixed with radionuclides in low concentrations, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), and metals (such as arsenic, antimony, cadmium, beryllium, chromium, and lead). Radioactive contaminants found in process equipment, buildings, cooling towers, burial grounds and wastewater ponds include uranium, plutonium, neptunium, and technetium⁹.

Two aquifers beneath the Plant store and supply groundwater; one is shallow and the other is deep. DOE reports that only the shallow aquifer is contaminated, with TCE being the main contaminant of concern and that the shallow aquifer is not of sufficient volume to be a source of drinking water. DOE maintains that no groundwater contamination has migrated offsite¹⁰. Arguments similar to these were used at the Pantex plant in Texas, where a shallow "perched" aquifer, supposedly confined, has now been found to be leaking into the much larger Ogallala aquifer, despite DOE’s earlier assurances. TCE is now contaminating the Ogallala Aquifer.

Contamination has also been detected in Little Beaver Creek and Big Run Creek¹¹. The Little Beaver Creek is the largest natural body of water on PORTS. During much of the year, particularly summer, wastewater from the Portsmouth Plant provides almost all of the flow in the Little Beaver, which empties into the Big Beaver Creek offsite. Big Beaver Creek enters the Scioto River, which then flows into the Ohio River¹². An April 1992 Ohio EPA study revealed that tissue from fish collected in area creeks around PORTS had PCBs and elevated levels of radiation. Stream sediments also showed radiation levels 5 times above the natural level, as well as increased concentrations of PCBs and heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, chromium, and mercury. At one site on Little Beaver Creek, the total uranium measured by the EPA was nearly twice the level at which corrective action would be required at civilian nuclear plants¹³. A second survey of the creeks and streams surrounding the facility is underway. The Ohio EPA expects to complete the study this year¹⁴.

Since the 1950s, the Portsmouth facility has released more than 40,000 pounds of uranium and an unreported amount of the radioactive gas, technetium-99, into local creeks and the air¹⁵. A 1991 DOE report revealed that uranium-contaminated wastes were routinely burned at the Plant from the mid-1950s to 1996. These wastes also contained larger-than-allowable amounts of heavy metals such as mercury, barium and cadmium. In a 1992 document, the DOE reported the release of 23,122 lb of uranium into the air and 17,123 lb of uranium into the water from 1955 to 1987. The report also recounted specific instances of pollution that have occurred at the Plant since its opening. One such example occurred on July 17, 1975 when the Portsmouth facility released 250,000 gallons of hypochlorate (a sterilizing chemical) from a decontamination building to a drainage ditch¹⁶.

As of 1998, there are 13,388 cylinders of depleted uranium hexafluoride stored at the Portsmouth site¹⁷. Several cylinders have been found to be leaking. When a cylinder is rusted through, UF₆ reacts with air to form compounds of uranium and fluorine. Some of these compounds are solid and plug the leak. However, the metal continues to corrode. Both radiation and hydrogen fluoride (a deadly gas even when diluted by air) can escape¹⁸. In March 1978, more than 13,000 lb of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) escaped when a cylinder was dropped and ruptured¹⁹. The Plant managers’ report about the incident described such releases of UF6 as routine. They also claimed no one was injured, contrary to what workers present at the Plant at that time have said²⁰.

Technetium-99 (Tc-99), although not naturally occurring in uranium ore, has contaminated PORTS because of the re-enrichment or recycling of uranium from experimental and naval reactors. Strongly adherent to internal piping and equipment, it builds up on enrichment converters and compressors. PORTS workers were exposed to technetium when equipment was opened for repair, upgrading or replacement. When technetium compounds are allowed to react with moist air, it hydrolyzes to form pertechnic acid, which also diffuses as a gas. On April 2, 1977, smoke emissions began in the X-705 (decontamination building) as soon as seals were removed from a converter taken from the enrichment process building (X-326). Tremendous amounts of red and orange smoke were seen escaping through closed overhead doors and cracks in the walls, and carried into other areas by strong drafts. Areas 200 feet from the release point became contaminated. Technetium levels were measured and found to be 5.7 times the allowable levels in the Plant.

Most of the time though, technetium was released as liquid effluent generated in the process of decontaminating the piping and equipment, and as solid waste in discarded or buried piping and equipment. In 1975, X-705 released 83 Ci of Tc-99 to a local stream. A weekly average sample in the east drainage ditch at PORTS exceeded the State of Ohio’s radiation limit (100 Ci gross beta per liter) by more than 300,000 times. PORTS personnel have estimated that peak Tc concentrations may have exceeded ERDA (now, DOE) standards by a factor of 20 and the State standard by 6,000,000. After 1975, the Plant tried to correct the problem by installing an ion exchange facility for X-705 effluents that will remove Tc-99. After removal of technetium, the ion exchange resins were placed in 55-gallon drums in the outdoor hot yard. PORTS acknowledged that this "solution" is also problematic, as it is possible for an exponential exothermic chemical reaction to occur similar to the chemical explosion of an americium-loaded ion exchange column at Hanford²¹. Since Tc-99 (a fission product) has been found in PORTS pipes and effluents, transuranics such as Pu, and fission products are likely to be present in the plant environs as well.

The DOE began a massive cleanup of the site in the 1980s. Not satisfied with the progress of the cleanup, the Ohio EPA entered into a Consent Agreement with the DOE and began monitoring operations at Portsmouth in 1989²². At the same time, DOE entered into a separate Consent Order with the US EPA. Since the Portsmouth site has not been included in the Superfund program, remediation efforts are conducted under the RCRA Corrective Action Program²³.

Workers at the Portsmouth facility were never told of the potential health dangers involved. Plant managers withheld crucial workplace-safety information from the rank and file^24,25. Workers were given either inadequate or improper protective gear or none at all^26,27. They have testified before Congress that radiation exposure data were either not collected or were altered²⁸. They have also testified that monitoring was lax or non-existent. Several Piketon workers are afflicted with or have died from a host of illnesses, including cancer and lung diseases. They believe that these diseases and deaths are related to their exposure to work areas that were contaminated with chemicals and radionuclides²⁹.

At first, a DOE report released to the Ohio EPA in August 1999 claimed that all the initial conversion and most of the initial enrichment was done at Paducah. As a result, the uranium material sent to Piketon for further enrichment had much lower plutonium levels and DOE was insisting that worker exposure at Portsmouth was negligible. DOE officials estimated that only one ounce of plutonium went to Piketon over the years, compared to the 12 ounces received at Paducah³⁰.

However, in September 1999, DOE officials confirmed that Piketon had its own conversion plant and got some of the plutonium-laced uranium directly. According to DOE documents, the enrichment of uranium from spent nuclear fuel at Piketon was halted in 1977 for fear that workers were being exposed to deadly radiation. The part of the X-705 building used to convert the raw reactor material was closed in 1978 because of concerns about leaks of radioactivity. However, other parts of the building are still being used today by USEC employees³¹.

Just how much plutonium was processed and what amounts of exposure occurred at PORTS from the 1950s to the 1970s is still unclear³². The DOE now admits it doesn’t know how much reactor fuel was processed at Portsmouth³³. It is likely that all the uranium and plutonium from West Valley reprocessed fuel was sent to Fernald, then onto Portsmouth. In 1993 and again in 1998, officials released a report regarding the presence of plutonium in the environment, including Little Beaver Creek³⁴. Past testing of the nearby patch of ground that received waste from the X-705 building indicated the presence of significant levels of plutonium³⁵.

DOE has recently concluded its own two-part investigation into plant practices at Portsmouth³⁶. They have found current practices to be significantly weak and inadequate in terms of radiological characterization (monitoring), radiation protection capability, and site management and oversight. Historical operations have put workers and the environment at great risk, with production schedules and costs taking precedence over health physics concerns and uranium inventory control.

Meanwhile, USEC has announced that it will cease PORTS operations in June of next year. However, DOE plans to keep the plant on standby and conduct research on new enrichment technologies.

Congress has recently approved a bill, which would compensate nuclear weapons workers, including those from the Paducah and Piketon plants, with $150,000 and lifetime healthcare benefits.

1. Past practices

According to the Independent Investigation, management at PORTS was inconsistent and ineffective. Environment, safety and health oversight was not rigorous. The emphasis was on production while concerns regarding health physics were secondary. Hazards were not effectively communicated to workers, with some supervisors telling workers that uranium is safe enough to eat. The belief that uranium was relatively harmless partly contributed to workers not wearing personnel protective equipment, such as respirators, even when performing work in areas with extensive airborne contamination. PORTS’ Health Physics group noted there was reluctance among Operations supervisors to implement or enforce their recommendations and follow Plant procedures, resulting in PORTS’ inability to control personnel exposure to radioactive materials.

Radiation and contamination surveys were available from the start of the Plant operations. Contamination exceeding limits were found in all major buildings over several years. Follow-up surveys revealed some areas continued to be contaminated above limits. This was attributed partly to a lax enforcement of decontamination requirements.

One of the most hazardous working conditions for PORTS workers existed at the X-705E building, where oxide conversion took place, from 1958 to 1978. Originally designed to recover and convert oxides of uranium from decontamination solutions in X-705 and incinerator ash into UF₆, it later processed uranium oxides from spent reactor fuel between 1959 and 1961. In 1965, it was temporarily shut down due to health physics concerns and uranium material balance problems. A 1965 Oak Ridge health protection review revealed potential concentration of transuranics in the processes, internal uranium exposure from enriched insoluble oxides undetectable by urinalysis, and inadequate air monitoring capability. The investigation team found a 1966 handwritten report explaining that the facility was not designed to handle or process reactor returns. It also mentioned that the practice of "de-smoking ash pots through the building ventilation system" likely explained the physical losses of small quantities of uranium. (The investigation team noted that the building ventilation system was unfiltered and reactor return materials had been processed in this facility; therefore, transuranics from the ash pots also likely entered the building ventilation system and were subsequently released to the environment unmonitored.)

Process modifications were then made, such as enclosing the process in a glove box, which were completed in 1967. Operations resumed in November 1967. However, efforts to reduce health physics problems between 1967 and 1973 were futile as operators and supervisors failed to follow operating procedures and protective measures. In 1976, a PORTS memo identified transuranics as a problem in the Plant, especially in X-705E. At that time, PORTS had an inventory of transuranic-contaminated feed materials for oxide conversion, which they wanted to process. Based on Oak Ridge recommendations, PORTS made some process improvements and performed test runs to model fluorination of transuranics and reduce leaks and contamination. In September 1978, the Health Physics management concluded these efforts were not enough, that the health risks were unacceptable, and recommended that X-705E be shut down. In October 1978, the oxide conversion facility was put on standby. Finally, in December 1978, PORTS requested cancellation of the oxide conversion project. Samples obtained after the shutdown showed transuranics at levels that indicated worker airborne exposures could have exceeded acceptable standards.

X-344, the feed manufacturing plant, converted uranium tetrafluoride (UF₄), a.k.a. "green salt", to UF₆ by reacting green salt with fluorine at high temperatures. Personnel recounted that the work environment was harsh, with exposure to uranium dust commonplace, room temperatures in tower areas exceeding 100F, and noise levels high. Hoppers, conveyers, and towers frequently broke down or clogged up. Green salt inside broken equipment were cleaned by hand by operators and maintenance personnel continuously worked on contaminated equipment. Powder spills were common and personnel recounted that green salt accumulated to several inches deep in some areas each shift. Ash, which resulted from the fluorination of UF₄ and found in piles in the tower pits, were reported to emit up to 6 rad/hr of beta-gamma radiation on contact, with 700 mrad/hr coming from gamma radiation. Operators were exposed to these radiation levels when they cleared out ash plugs in the towers and when they changed ash receivers. The investigation team found health physics surveys of X-344 routinely showing high levels of alpha contamination, even after decontamination. During normal operations, a 1961 survey indicated that radiation levels 1 foot from the fluorination towers were usually 50 mrad/hr or less. During one six-month period, the maximum level measured was 100 mrad/hr. It is estimated that about 12,000 metric tons of UF₄ was processed in X-244, with more than 400 kg of uranium lost each year to the atmosphere in the form of dust and fumes. Workers wore overalls and gloves, while respirator use was inconsistent.

At PORTS, equipment was decontaminated and uranium was recovered from decontamination solutions at X-705, the Decontamination building. Physically separate from the oxide conversion area, the hazards associated with the decontamination and recovery areas included radionuclides (such as Tc, U, and transuranics), acids, organic solvents (such as TCE), asbestos, and PCBs. The health physics personnel discovered that hands, shoes, and coveralls were frequently contaminated with radioactive materials. Limits for airborne radioactive materials were often exceeded in X-705. Radiological hazards in X-705 were considered significant because they handled equipment that were involved in uranium recovery and oxide conversion processes, which tended to concentrate transuranic materials, fission products, and insoluble forms of uranium. Prior to the mid-1970s, it was assumed that all radioactivity detected in X-705 was due to uranium only.

Workers were also exposed to various toxic gases, solvents, and metals at PORTS. TCE was widely used as a degreaser and general cleaning agent. Mercury was used in several process equipment and chemical traps. Beryllium exposure may have resulted from machining of Be Cu-alloy piping components, use of Be as a coating on light bulbs, and use of welding rods that contained Be.

The public may also have been exposed to PORTS contamination through the contaminated scrap and surplus materials that were auctioned off or sold to the public. This likelihood stemmed from the investigation team’s review of reports documenting PORTS’ failure to consistently segregate clean and contaminated materials and perform pre-sale surveys of the items.

Incidents of routine or accidental or planned releases of radioactive materials and fluorine were frequent. However, onsite and offsite air monitoring was not initiated until the mid-1960s. It is estimated that more than 23,000 lb of uranium and 27 Ci of technetium were released into the atmosphere from 1954 to 1993. The biggest release was in March 1978, when a cylinder of UF₆ was dropped and ruptured, releasing over 13,000 lb UF₆ to the environment. Other major releases of uranium that occurred involved valve failures on tails cylinders and process malfunctions in purge cascades. As for fluorine and/or fluorides, one significant release occurred in July 1973, when a 30- to 40- foot high column of hydrogen fluoride vapor was observed coming out the X-342 vent stack. At other times, there were several reports of offensive fluorine fumes, breathing difficulty, and in some cases respiratory tract damage attributed to fluorine releases.

Vent emissions were not monitored continuously until the mid-1980s. Although grab sampling was performed and space recorders were used to monitor vent emissions, they proved to be problematic, unreliable and inaccurate, prompting a Vent Committee formed in the 1980s to recommend continuous monitoring.

"Jetting", that is purging the cascade cells of uranium to prepare it for maintenance or repair, were routinely done and unmonitored throughout Plant history.

Diffuse and fugitive emissions were not monitored but can be confirmed with notable contamination found on roofs, grounds, and work areas. One example would be the practice of de-smoking ash pots through X-705E building’s unfiltered ventilation system, which resulted in the release of unknown quantities of uranium and transuranics to the environment.

Releases of liquid effluents from Plant operations to the environment were also typical. These effluents were discharged via sanitary sewer and storm water drainage systems. Effluent materials that did not go through wastewater treatment facilities and recovery systems were routed to the various outfalls and ditches that led to Little Beaver Creek and ultimately to the Scioto River. Little Beaver Creek, which flows into Big Beaver Creek (which flows into the Scioto River), received most of the Plant effluents, mainly from the north and east sides of the Plant.

The X-701B holding pond was a major effluent source to Little Beaver Creek. Unlined, most of the waste discharged to the pond came from the X-705 Decontamination Building and X-700 Chemical Cleaning Facility.

The X-700 facility used TCE from 1955 to 1987 for degreasing. It was the major source of TCE in X-701B and the entire east drainage ditch area.

Most X-705 process effluents were discharged to the X-701B holding pond. Uranium comprised 92% (76.5 kg) of the total radioactivity released to the holding pond in 1969 and 90% (117 kg) of the total in 1970. PORTS was not monitoring the liquid effluents for transuranics and technetium around that time. However, by 1976, transuranics had been identified in X-705 raffinates, which were discharged to the X-701B holding pond. Subsequent monitoring revealed high levels of transuranics in the sludge of the holding pond and in the effluents from the pond to the east drainage ditch. In 1977, PORTS investigated transuranic contamination in Little and Big Beaver Creeks’ sediments. Some samples had low levels of plutonium and neptunium.

The investigation team found 1977 interdepartmental documents, which revealed that effluents from the X-705 cleaning facilities were bypassing X-701B and discharging directly to the east drainage ditch, which led to the Little Beaver Creek. This was reportedly corrected shortly after discovery.

Over the years, fish kills occurred in Little Beaver and Big Run Creeks reportedly due to oxygen depletion or elevated concentrations of metals or sodium hydroxide spills, which resulted from spills at and discharges from the Plant.

2. Current practices

Although DOE found current environmental and health risks have been reduced, practices at the Plant still leave much to be desired. PORTS has not adequately characterized and analyzed the contamination problem.

Significant weaknesses were discovered in the Plant’s radiation monitoring program, which puts into question exposure and risk estimates, and cleanup decisions and progress. They have designed and conducted radiological surveys that do not meet DOE standards. They have eliminated various media from surveillance. For example, direct sediment sampling at liquid discharge points is not being performed. Some surface water outfalls are not being evaluated. Their radiological sampling has been limited to generic analyses (such as gross alpha, gross beta, total uranium), instead of testing for specific isotopes, making it impossible then to establish compliance with isotope-specific standards and requirements, and resulting in an underestimate of radiological risks. For example, data on gross alpha measurements in water were incorrectly compared to a DCG of 600 pCi/L for gross alpha activity in water. DCGs are derived dose-based numbers and thus defined only for individual isotopes. A DCG of 600 pCi/L is defined for U-238. A DCG of 500 pCi/L is specified for U-234. As DOE has said, there is no method for comparing gross alpha measurements against isotopic limits. PORTS’ monitoring program has NEVER showed any detectable transuranic contamination in any of their samples. However, an OH EPA investigation found low levels of plutonium in Little Beaver Creek sediments and DOE’s independent investigation found detectable levels of transuranics in most stream sediment samples on the east side of the plant and from X-6619 outfall (wastewater treatment plant).

Radiological exposure pathways have not been fully assessed since not all effluent emission/discharge points are being monitored and evaluated. In air, for example, fugitive emissions from PORTS are still not completely known. The DOE investigation team found that some air samplers have been out of service for more than 6 months. Air strippers at groundwater treatment facilities are not being checked for Tc-99, and no health physics surveys of air are being conducted in these areas.

Radiological risks have been underestimated. Since PORTS has little or no isotopic uranium data needed for risk assessments, they calculated the isotopic uranium composition from total uranium mass by wrongly assuming natural uranium isotopic ratios. Transuranics were not included in risk assessments since PORTS never detected them, while certain uranium daughter products were inexplicably not factored into risk estimates.

Remediation progress is in doubt. For example, it is claimed that TCE and Tc-99 contamination of groundwater has not migrated offsite due to PORTS’ efforts, such as the installation of a slurry wall at the X-749 landfill that is supposed to intercept these contaminants. However, this assertion cannot be confirmed because PORTS is not sampling beyond the slurry wall to verify its effectiveness in intercepting the contamination.

3. Independent investigation team’s sampling results

In general, sampling results obtained by investigation team are consistent with past environmental sampling results taken by PORTS. Analyses of samples taken by the investigation team and split with PORTS are in broad agreement, except when it came to transuranics. DOE concluded that the discrepancies arose from less sensitive equipment used by PORTS in its analysis.

Groundwater sampling has confirmed that it is contaminated with radionuclides, metals, and VOCs. Uranium, thorium, neptunium, and technetium were all detected. Uranium, thorium and neptunium were well below DCGs. In one well, X705-01G, Tc-99 was detected at 5,439 pCi/L, a level that would exceed EPA drinking water standards of 4 mrem/yr. TCE is the VOC of major concern, with levels significantly exceeding the 5-mg/L MCL, up to 4,800 times at the X-230J7 interceptor trench. Concentrations of aluminum and iron exceeded secondary drinking water standards. Beryllium was not detected while chromium was found at very low levels in some samples.

Uranium, thorium, neptunium, and technetium were detected in surface water, although at levels not exceeding DCGs. A sample taken from the outfall of the sewage treatment facility had Np-237 of 0.29 pCi/L. Although well below the DCG, the fact that neptunium was detected is in direct contrast with PORTS’ not detecting any transuranics so far. Plus, this sample came from liquid that was already processed and filtered at the sewage treatment facility, so the input concentration must have been much higher. Uranium levels were low; however, if one takes the uranium mass-to-activity ratios for the collected samples, they indicate enrichments higher than that of natural uranium, up to 4%. Concentrations of aluminum, iron, and manganese that exceeded secondary public drinking water standards were detected in surface water samples. Chromium and beryllium were not detected.

Uranium, Th-230, Tc-99 were detected in all sediment samples, which were taken from area streams and Little Beaver Creek. Contamination was found to be above background. The uranium mass-to-activity ratio for one sample indicates a more than 10% U-235 enrichment, much higher than what is ‘normal’ for natural uranium. Low concentrations of transuranics were found in several sediment samples that were taken from Little Beaver Creek and the streams that discharge into it. The concentration of Pu-238 ranged from 0.001 to 0.008 pCi/g while Pu-239/240 ranged from 0.002 to 0.037 pCi/g. Np-237 ranged from 0.004 to 0.054 pCi/g. PCBs were detected in all samples and concentration ranged from 35.8 to 644 mg/kg.

Historically, it was found that uranium inventory control and health physics concerns were secondary to production schedules and costs. Radioactive and hazardous materials were spilled or routinely released to the environment from production-related facilities and work activities. Environmental releases and worker exposures were grossly underestimated due to poor monitoring. Safety and health programs were not adequately implemented and were ineffective in protecting the workers.

Radiation monitoring data taken by PORTS are deficient. Risk analysis and cleanup goals and actions, which were based on inadequate data, are thus questionable. Any conclusions reached regarding PORTS operations and remediation must be re-examined.

Under the RESOLVE grant, RWMA will be working with PRESS and UEP to conduct an independent review of data, studies, and reports on PORTS. With DOE’s permission, a site tour will be conducted to familiarize us with the lay of the land. We will look into the presence of transuranics (such as plutonium) and fission products (such as Tc-99). In particular, we will be reviewing the monitoring data in the East Drainage Ditch, X-705E landfills, X-701B holding pond, X-700 facility and Little Beaver Creek for the presence of Tc-99 and transuranics. RWMA will also investigate the environmental and health effects (both on- and off-site) of PORTS operations. We will also evaluate the progress and effectiveness of the site cleanup, and make recommendations to the PRESS and UEP and to State and Federal agencies.

1 MB Lafferty. "US burned radioactive waste at Piketon plant", The Columbus Dispatch, 11/21/93.

2 SI Schwartz. US Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, Testing, and Production, and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Facilities, 10/12/99.

3 Department of Energy (DOE). Environmental Assessment, Construction and Operation of an Industrial Solid Waste Landfill at Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, DOE/EA-0767, Oct 1995.

4 M Resnikoff. Cost/Benefits of U/Pu Recycle, 10/11/82.

5 J Riskind. "Senate to Investigate Past Safety Practices Piketon Nuclear Plant", The Columbus Dispatch, 3/3/00.

6 J Malone. "Plant’s reaction risk to be studied", The Courier-Journal, 3/2/00.

7 USEC has recently announced its intentions to upgrade the Paducah plant so that it can enrich uranium independently of Portsmouth. They are considering laying off workers and shutting down one facility to cut costs. (J Walker. "USEC upgrade sought in Paducah", Paducah Sun, 3/3/00; J Riskind, "USEC privatization debate fueled by ‘power politics’", The Columbus Dispatch, 4/12/00).

8 Lafferty, 11/21/93.

8 Department of Energy (DOE). 1996 Baseline Environmental Management Report, 1996.

10 Ibid.

11 "The state’s Big 3 messes", The Columbus Dispatch, 10/1/95.

12 DOE, 1995.

13 MB Lafferty. "Radiation high in fish near Piketon", The Columbus Dispatch, 2/7/93.

14 Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 3/22/00, http://offo2.epa.state.oh.us/PORTSMOUTH/portsmouth.htm.

15 "The state’s Big 3 messes", The Columbus Dispatch, 10/1/95.

16 Lafferty, 11/21/93.

17 D Daniels. "DOE hears input on draft statement", Portsmouth Daily Times, 2/27/98.

18 M Lafferty. "Huge tanks of nuclear waste rusting away", The Columbus Dispatch, 3/10/96.

19 DOE. Independent Investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, vol. 1, May 2000.

20 J Riskind. "Piketon’s heavy toll", The Columbus Dispatch, 10/29/99.

21 Resnikoff, 1982.

22 Lafferty, 2/7/93.

23 Ohio EPA, 3/22/00.

24 F Hinchey. "Piketon workers share their stories", The Columbus Dispatch, 11/31/99.

25 Riskind, 10/29/99.

26 B Dreitzler. "Activist says wider probe is warranted", The Columbus Dispatch, 8/23/99.

27 K Rizzo. "Radiation Records Being Investigated", Associated Press, 3/22/00.

28 J Riskind, "Piketon workers’ testimony gets results", The Columbus Dispatch, 3/23/00.

29 J Carroll, "Ex-uranium workers had host of ills", The Courier-Journal, 3/23/00.

30 B Dreitzler and J Riskind. "Plutonium admission angers workers", The Columbus Dispatch, 9/16/99.

31 Dreitzler and Riskind, 9/16/99.

32 M Richard. "Report: Piketon workers exposed", The People’s Defender, 8/18/99.

33 Dreitzler and Riskind, 9/16/99.

34 Richard, 8/18/99.

35 Dreitzler and Riskind, 9/16/99.

36 DOE. Independent Investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, vol. 1 & 2, May 2000.

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