Biodefense Research in Kentucky
In
2007 a consortium composed of the University of Kentucky, the University of
Tennessee, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the University of Louisville
proposed a site near Somerset, Kentucky, for the construction of a Department of
Homeland Security National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).
Nearly 5000 residents of Pulaski County signed a petition against the
laboratory drafted by farmers living near the proposed site; and protesters
noisily greeted the site evaluation team that visited the area in the spring of
2007. Subsequently the site was
eliminated from consideration, presumably at least in part because of the local
opposition.
After
the elimination of Kentucky from consideration for the proposed facility, the
subject of research on biodefense within the state largely dropped out of the
Kentucky media. However, Kentucky is
active in biodefense today and has been for years.
Biosafety
laboratories are classified by the type of biological agents used in them and by
the degree of risk that these agents pose to workers, members of the community
and the environment. The National
Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility proposed for Pulaski County was a Biosafety
Laboratory-4 (BSL-4). The University
of Kentucky operates a Biosafety Laboratory-3 (BSL-3), and the University of
Louisville is building another.
BSL-4
labs involve the most dangerous biological agents, for which no effective
vaccines or treatments are available. Keith
Rhodes, chief technologist of the Center for Technology and Engineering Applied
Research and Methods, in testimony to a Congressional committee noted that
“Types of agents that are typically handled in BSL-4 labs include, for
example, Ebola, hemorrhagic fevers, and smallpox.”
He states that, on the other hand, “Work in BSL-3 labs involves agents
that may cause serious and potentially lethal infection.
In some cases, there are vaccines or effective treatments available.
Types of agents that are typically handled in BSL-3 labs include, for
example, anthrax, West Nile Virus, Q fever, tularemia, and avian flu.”
To
Rhodes’ BSL-3 list we can add plague, caused by the bacterium Yersinia
pestis, for plague has been studied for years at the University of
Kentucky’s BSL-3 laboratory. The
University of Louisville is known for its work on Francisella tularensis, which causes tularemia.
Under
natural conditions, plague is transmitted to humans by contaminated rodents or
fleas. In warfare, contaminated
fleas would likely carry bubonic plague, and aerosols would carry bacteria that
would cause pneumonic plague. Some
fifty percent of untreated victims of bubonic plague die; one hundred percent of
untreated victims of pneumonic plague die. Tularemia,
caused by the inhalation of the bacterium, produces severe respiratory problems.
Untreated victims may die, but only one percent of victims treated with
antibiotics die.
University
of Kentucky
Two
professors from the University of Kentucky’s Department of Microbiology,
Immunology, and Molecular Genetics, were participants in the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Disease’s (NIAID’s) Blue Ribbon Panel on
Bioterrorism and Its Implications for Biomedical Research, February 4-5, 2002,
which played a major role in setting the research agenda that NIAID has since
followed. Also in 2002 the University of Kentucky posted on its Web site an
article by Alicia P. Gregory summarizing the three types of bio-terror related
studies carried out at the university: “UK
scientists are testing a new smallpox vaccine for the military, making
fundamental discoveries about the bacteria that cause plague, and finding better
ways to protect animals, fruits and vegetables from microbes.”
The
testing of a smallpox vaccine to which Gregory referred, involved inoculating
volunteers with either the existing smallpox vaccine or a new vaccine and
subsequently analyzing their blood for antibodies specific to smallpox.
The vaccine was made from a weakened virus called vaccinia and could not
cause smallpox. In 2008 the
university is testing the safety of a new smallpox vaccine Imvamume for people
with chronic inflammatory skin conditions. Again
the actual smallpox virus is not involved.
The
work on plague, on the other hand, appears to involve the actual bacteria that
cause plague. The university received grants to study plague from NIAID for
fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2006; and university researchers have over the
years published numerous articles on plague, in particular the mechanisms by
which the bacterium attacks and by which an immune system responds. A recent
article by university researchers, indicates that research is ongoing,
“yadBC of Yersinia pestis, a New Virulence Determinant for Bubonic Plague,”
by Stanislav Forman et al., published in Infection
and Immunity in February 2008.
University
of Louisville
At
Louisville’s Center of Predictive Medicine (CPM) for Biodefense and Emerging
Infectious Diseases, the university is constructing a BSL-3 Laboratory.
The laboratory will cost an estimated $34.6 million, of which $22 million
was supplied by a 2005 grant from NIAIS, part of the National Institutes of
Health. The university is supplying
the balance. Construction of the
laboratory, which will encompass 45,000 square feet, is scheduled to be
completed in late 2008 or early 2009.
The Louisville laboratory will be one of a network of Regional
Biocontainment Laboratories, at research institutions across the nation.
The regional laboratories are required to have BSL-3 and BSL-2 facilities
(used for agents presenting a lesser risk than those at the BSL-3 facilities),
animal facilities, and research support space.
They are to be used by researchers at the host institution and by other
biodefense researchers within the region, particularly those within the Regional
Centers of Excellence in Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases.
The regional laboratories will also assist publish health efforts at the
national, state, and local levels in the event of a biological attack.
Research on tularemia goes back at Louisville to at least until 1971. In that year Bill Brown and Earl A. Alluisi of the university’s
Performance Research Laboratory, published an article entitled “Behavioral
Effects of Infectious Diseases,” which discussed Franciscella tularensis. For
fiscal year 2006, the university received a grant from NIAI
to study the “Molecular Pathogenesis of Francisella tularensis,” and
in 2007 Blackwell published the first book presenting a thorough scientific
analysis of the illness, Francisella tularensis: Biology, Pathogenicity, Epidemiology, and
Biodefense for which the first editor is Yousef Abu Kwaik of the University
of Louisville’s College of Medicine. (We
do not know whether live Francisella
tularensis have been used at Louisville in the absence of a BSL-3 lab.)
Considerations
When
lethal agents are handled, there are risks. Rhodes in his testimony noted,
“Although high-containment labs are designed to promote the safety of
researchers and the public, accidents and security breaches have occurred in the
past. In addition, these labs can be
used by terrorists or people with malicious intent to acquire or develop harmful
biological agents, posing a severe national security and public health
threat.” The anthrax-laden
envelopes that caused deaths in 2001 illustrate the potential for use of
biological agents by terrorists. Various
incidents at laboratories in recent years show that accidents can happen.
According to the Dallas Morning News (October 26, 2007), one of these incidents occurred at the University of Kentucky:
“In May [2007], a lab employee at the University of Kentucky was exposed to
plague bacteria after a protective bag leaked.”
In the summer of 2008 the university was conducting a job search for a
Biological Safety Specialist Senior, to develop and maintain a biosafety
program. Whether any benefits derived from the research are worth the risks is a
question that needs to be discussed.
Selected
Sources:
American Biological Safety
Association. “Job
Opportunities.” Available online at http://www.absa.org/biojobs.html,
accessed May 31, 2008. Describes available jobs at biocontainment laboratories,
including those in Kentucky.
Auchincloss, Hugh.
“Protecting the Public Health: The
Importance of NIH Biodefense Research Infrastructure.” Statement before the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
U.S. House of Representatives. October
4, 2007. Available online at http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/about/directors/congress/2007/Auchincloss100407FINAL.pdf
.
Davis, Mary Byrd and Arthur H.
Purcell. Weapons
of Mass Destruction. New York:
Facts on File, 2006. Contains an
overview of biological warfare and defense.
Federation of American
Scientists. “Biocontainment Laboratories.” Available online at http://www.fas.org/biosecurity/resource/research.htm
.
Gronvall, Gigi Kwik et al.
“NIAID-Funded Regional Biocontainment Laboratories (BSL-3) (Table 2)”
in “High-Containment Biodefense Research Laboratories:
Meeting Report and Center Recommendations.”
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Vol. 5, no. 1, 2007, available online
through http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org
.
Gregory, Alicia P. “Countering
Bioterror.” Odyssey, Fall 2002.
Available online at http://www.research.uky.edu/odyssey/fall02/bioterrorism.html
.
“Kentucky Researchers Testing
Smallpox Vaccine,” Associated Press, Lexington
Herald-Leader, August 31, 2008.
Ramshaw, Emily.
“Boom in Biodefense Labs Sparks Security Debate.” The Dallas Morning News, October 26, 2007, available online at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/102707dntexbioterrorism.366092c.html
Rhodes, Keith.
High-Containment Biosafety
Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the Oversight of the Proliferation of
BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States.
Report GAO-08-108T. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office,
2007. Available online through the Web site, http://www.gao.gov
.
The Sunshine Project. Web site, http://www.sunshine-project.org.
The owner of this site stopped posting new material on it in February
2008, but they has left the archives online for the use of researchers.
The minutes of the University of Kentucky and University of Louisville
Institutional Biosafety Committees to 2006 are available on this Web site.
University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center, Center for Biosecurity. Web
site, http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org
. This web site has links to a wide
variety of documents and other resources.
copyright©
2008 by EcoPerspectives